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At the sitting of 15 January 1990 the President of Parliament announced that he had referred the motion for a resolution by Mr Goria on the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Doe. 83-0759189) to the Political Affairs Committee pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of 
Procedure. 
At its meeting of 31 January 1990 the Political Affairs Committee decided to draw up a report. lt appointed Mr Romeos rapporteur on 1 February 
1990. 
The committee considered the draft interim report at its meetings of 22 May, 28-29 June and 20 September 1990. 
At the last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution by 26 votes to 3 with 3 abstentions. 
The following took part in the vote: Goria, chairman; Crampton, first vice-chairman; Defraigne, second vice-chairman; van den Brink, third vice-
chairman; Romeos, rapporteur; Antony (for SchOnhuber), Baget Bozzo, Bertens (for Capucho), Lord Bethell, Cassanmagnago Cerretti, lb 
Christensen, Coates, Dillen, Ephremidis, Femanclez Albor (for Ferrer (Rule 111 (2)), Ford, Jepsen, Lagakos (for Pesmazoglou), Landa Menclibe 
(for Fini), Langer, Newens (for Balfe), Paisley, Penders, Piermont, Planas, Pons Grau (for Moran Lopez), Saby (for Cheysson), Sakellariou, Stavrou 
(for Habsburg), Verde i Aldea. Waiter and White. 
The report was tabled on 24 September 1990. 
The deadline for tabling amendments will appear on the draft agenda for the part-session at which the report is to be considered. 
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A 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(Helsinki 11 Conference) 
The European Parliament, 
A. having regard to: 
- the resolution tabled by Mr Goria (83-0759/89) calling on the 
Council to take steps for the full and active involvement of the 
Community in the Helsanki 11 Conference, 
- all its resolutions on security in Western Europe and the 
agreements on disarmament, 
the resolutions adopted between 1968 and 1986 on the 
Conference on Secunty and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 
its resolution on the Helsinki Final Act (82-0054/86), 
- its resolutions on recent developments in Central and Eastern 
Europe and the unification of Germany, 
- its resolutions on the Community's relations with the 
COMECON countnes, 
- the interim report by the Political Affairs Committee on the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki 11) 
(Doe. A3-0226190), 
B. having regard to the declarations of the summit meetings of 
Madrid, Rhodes, Strasbourg and Dublin on the progress of 
negotiations on disarmament and the CSCE, 
C. noting the decisions taken- within the framework of the CSCE-
dunng the conferences in Vienna (CFE and CSBM), London 
(information), Paris and Copenhagen (the human dimension) 
and Bonn (economic cooperation) a'ld the positions adopted at 
the Warsaw Pact summit which ammeciately preceded it, 
D. recalling the positions of the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting 
in Scotland on 7 and 8 June 1990, 
The results of the Helsinki Final Act 
The European Parliament notes that: 
The Helsinki Final Act has contributed, particularly through the 
decisions of the bodies of the CSCE, to stabilizing the climate of 
peace and cooperation in Europe and respect for human rights, 
despite the fact that it was a political text and not an international 
treaty; 
2. The countries participating in the CSCE, with certain exceptions, 
have promoted the ten basic principles of the Final Act; 
3. Despite the progress made in the important area of human rights, 
at has been acknowledged that their continued violation jeopardizes 
demoaacy, peace and cooperation; the situation in Romania and 
Bulgaria gives particular cause for concern in this respect; 
4. The majority of countries participating in the CSCE have respected 
the principles of territorial antegrity, frontiers and the sovereign 
equality of States; 
5. Unfortunately, circumstances have arisen in which the above 
principles have been violated by the use of force, and the fifth 
pnnciple of the Final Act on the peaceful solution of differences 
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has been agnored; 
6. In the fifteen years since the signing of the Final Act, considerable 
progress has been made on cooperation in numerous sectors; 
although it has failed to reverse Europe's division into two 
politically, economically and militarily opposed blocs, that divisaon 
fortunately seems to be disappearing; 
7. The principles of the Helsinki Final Act, which does not constitute 
an antemational convention but a political text, have failed to 
prevent the flaring up and/or persistence of regional conflicts, 
especially in the Mediterranean area; 
8. In conclusion, the principles of the Final Act have helped open up 
the way to maJOr changes an Europe and provide a framework for 
cooperation which, though not yet effective in the Mediterranean 
region for example, nevertheless forms a basis on which it is now 
both possible and necessary to make significant further progress; 
11. The changes in Europe 
9. The changes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and 
the dismantling of the Berlin Wall have brought an end to the 
division of Europe and set the final seal on the Yalta Agreements; 
10. The continued progress of many countries towards the 
establishment of democrabc regimes based on free elections 
opens the way for a peaceful and democratic united Europe 
and creates the conditions for economic cooperation based on 
the free movement of individuals, goods, capital and services; 
11. The changes in Europe offer particular opportunities in the field 
of security policy; the decades of military confrontation 
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact must be replaced by a 
process of ongoing cooperation between the two organizations; 
12. The serious economic problems facing the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe threaten progress towards both 
demoaatization and peace; 
13. The unification of Germany is justifiably welcomed as the end 
of the Cold War and the beganning of the new construction of 
Europe; 
14. The political, economic and defence issues arising from the 
unification of Germany are tied up completely with European 
security and cooperation; 
Ill. Helsinki 11 
15. The countries of Europe and the USA have already agreed that 
the CSCE is the appropriate framework for plannang the new 
Europe and establishing a new order of peace which wall cover 
all the countnes participating in the CSCE and the sensatave 
region of the Mediterranean; 
16. The new CSCE summit conference - Helsinki 11 - must solve all 
the problems connected with security and cooperation and its 
decisions should take the form of an international treaty; 
17. The context in which the conference should take place should 
be determined by the following points: 
- the decisions and agreements of the CSCE (Bonn Conference 
on economic cooperation, Copenhagen Conference on the 
human dimension, Majorca meeting on the Mediterranean 
dimension, agreements on conventional arms limatation), 
the decisions of the European summit meetings and, in 
particular, the decisions of the special Dublin Conference, 
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- Pres1dent Mitterrand's proposals on a pan-European 
confederation and President Gorbachev's proposals on a 
common European home, 
- the Belgian Govemmenrs proposal. on the creation of a 
European Defence Council, 
- Prime Minister Mazowiecki's proposal on a European 
Cooperation Council which would include the USA, Canada and 
the Soviet Union and the related proposal of Czechoslovakia's 
Prime Minister Have! on the creation of a European Security 
Commission, 
- the decisions of the special European Council meeting in 
Dublin: 
- the proposals that have been or may be made by the European 
Parliament or the various national parliaments on this subject; 
18. The basic aims of the conference shall include: 
- extencing the circle of signatory States to include Albania at 
least and, possibly, other countries of the Mediterranean region 
that were excluded previously: 
- formulating a pan-European security system based on 
cooperation in the political, environmental and economic 
spheres and mutual trust: 
- establishing new principles that are recognized and accepted by 
all par1ies and setting up some organization such as a CSCE 
Security Council to promote these principles and monitor 
compliance with them: 
19. In this context, a suitable procedure should be sought for the 
reshaping of the defence treaties and a pan-European body 
convened to implement security policy throughout Europe as a 
whole, involving an the countries participating in the CSCE: 
20. The latest developments in the Persian Gulf show that, though 
military confrontation has abated in Europe, new security policy 
issues will arise not only inside Europe but also beyond i1s 
confines, and the European countries should take a united 
stand in response to such challenges; 
21. Any decisions and agreements at the 4 + 2 conference 
concerning the position of a united Germany in the existing 
defence system must be made with a European security system 
in vieW; 
22. In tandem with the Helsinki 11 Conference, swifter action is 
needed and new initiativee must be taken with regard to 
disarmament, the baMing of chemical weapons, controlling the 
production and sale of weapons, the sln.lcture of the armed 
forces and determining the future of foreign military cispositions: 
naturally, negotiations should be intensified to achieve a drastic 
reduction in conventional, nuclear, chemical and bacteriological 
weapons with mutual and coUective verification; 
23. The conference should determine the procedure and 
mechanisms for intervening in any border disputes so as to 
avoid dangerous conflicts developing; 
24. In the same spirit, it would be advisable to determine the 
procedure for intervening in complicated situations at the 
external borders of the territory covered by the collective 
security system; 
25. In order to achieve this goal, intervention procedures must be 
established with a view to the peaceful settlement of differences 
and the avoidance of armed conflict; 
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26. lt is clear that a collective secunty system will not be able to 
operate unless existing differences are resolved and peace is 
established in areas where disputes and conflicts exist because 
of violent interventions, as is still the case in various parts of 
Europe; 
27. In view of the unanimous agreement that security and peace in 
Europe will be based on cooperation rather than mllitarization, 
Helsinki 11 must tackle the following basic issues: 
(a) the recognition and inviolability of current borders, respect 
for the sovereign equality of states and territorial integrity, 
(b) the definition of the substance of and the procedures for 
practising the right of self-determination of those entided to 
exercise that right, 
(c) the definition of the rights and obligations of minorities within 
states, within the framework of the principles of the Helsinki 
Final Act on respect for the unity and territorial integrity of 
States, 
(d) the institution of pluralist democracy w1th free elections and 
respect for human rights and the nghts of minorities as a 
prerequisite for a country's participation in the European 
edifice, 
(e) human rights must be given a new dimension to meet the 
social and economic requirements of individuals - the right 
tbawnkirdnmigttd:lal~,ahe'lagAtltmantilaatimttar:ttiQ(f~s 
an obligation for us all; consequendy, measures are required 
whose implementation by all the countries of the CSCE is 
mandatory; 
(g) organized crime, particularly that linked to the drugs trade, 
and terrorism threaten social peace and create further 
interstate cisputes; regulations that are accepted and 
implemented joindy must therefore be introduced; 
28. lt is self-evident that the balanced development of all European 
countries and the closing of the gap between rich and poor 
countries can be achieved through economic cooperation and 
solidarity; 
29. To this end, attention should be given to the creation of a 
Solidarity Fund which could also assist the poorer countries of 
the Third World. This fund could be financed from the 
resourc:es saved as a result of reductions in armaments; 
IV. Institutions and bodies of Helsinki 11 
30. To implement and monitor the decisions of the Conference, 
permanent arrangements and bodies w1th a fixed seat must be 
set up, in partia.~lar: 
(a) a permanent secretariat 
(b) a committee of permanent representatives 
(c) a council of foreign ministers 
(d) regular summit meetings; 
All these bodes could operate within the framework of a European 
Security Council which, on the basis of the experience of the 
United Nations, should acquire the possibility of swift and effective 
intervention; 
31. Decisions on any form of intervention must be taken collectively 
and always with the aim of maintaining peace and averting the 
use of force; 
PE 141.404/fin. 
32. Supranational bodies set up to implement and momtor the 
dec1sions of Helsinki 11 should be given broader scope through 
the convocation of a parliamentary assembly, so that the whole 
new European edifice has firm democratic foundations; the 
Council of Europe could constitute the basis for such a 
parliamentary assembly; 
V. The Community's role 
33. Respect for human rights must be a statutory requirement of 
states taking part in Helsinki 11 processes and decisions; this 
calls for the strengthening of the role and effectiveness of the 
European Court of Human Rights; 
34. The European Community can and must play a decisive role in 
Helsinki 11 1n shaping the new structure of Europe; 
35. The European Community is at present the only stable and 
dynamic supranational organization of states with a political and 
economiC dimension; 
36. To serve as the central focus of the new Europe, the 
Community must display a united front throughout both the 
CSCE and Helsinki 11 process; 
37. This aim must be achieved at the EC countries' forthcoming 
Intergovernmental conference by acceleratmg the movement 
towards political integration, economic and monetary union and 




38. The untied front presented by the Community during these 
processes must be based on firm democratic foundattons and 
this presupposes constant cooperation on the part of the 
Council and the Commission wtth the European Par1iament and 
the national parliaments; 
39. The European Parliament must play a consistent and dearly 
defined role in the Helsinki 11 process: 
(a) The European Parliament should be represented at the 35-
nation summit by its Pres1dent and a small delegation of 
members, 
(b) European Parliament observers should be present at all 
CSCE meetings, as was the case at the Copenhagen 
Conference; to that end, the European Parliament should set 
up a temporary EP/CSCE delegation, appointed by the 
Political Affairs Committee, for the duration of CSCE 11, 
(c) The Council Presidency should keep the European 
Parliament regularly briefed on the positions of the Twelve 
at the various CSCE conferences; 
40. The forthcoming conference between the European Parliament 
and the national parliaments in Rome must make provision for 
national parliaments to participate in the abovementioned 
processes and in the processes leading to the integratiOn of the 
European Community; 
41. Instructs 11s President to forward this resolution to the 
Commission, the Council, the Foreign Ministers of the Member 
States meeting in EPC and the governments and par1iaments 





1. The Helsinki Final~. which was adopted in 1975, paved the way 
for cooperation between European nations and for concerted efforts 
to preserve peace, foster solidarity and secure respect for human 
rights. 
2. The Final Act is the fruit of the common experience of European 
nations living through the two World Wars, the Cold War and the 
period of detente. For the people of Central and Eastern Europe it 
was the most important point of reference in their quest for freedom 
and democracy. 
3. Now, in the new era dawning in Europe, a new framewor1< for 
international cooperation must be found, the fundamental principles 
of the Final Act recast 
4. With the radical changes in Central and Eastern Europe- countries 
still moving towards democratization, the establishment of pluralist 
regimes and respect for human rights - and the reunification of 
Germany, events have leapt ahead of Helsinki. 
5. In the new pan-European order now unfolcing it is vital that an 
architecture be designed and set in place with the aim of preserving 
peace, promoting political cooperation and mutual economic support. 
6. All of these developments raise questions about the very future of 
the continent of Europe. Questions such as the future of the military 
alliances, the format for and operation of pan-European security, the 
framewor1< for cooperation, the impact of the German question on the 
new pan-European order, the future of existing structures, institutions 
and organizations, the future of the Community itself and, finally, the 
need for an instiiUiional agreement lo encompass all these aspects, 
a blueprint for an eventual peace treaty. 
7 These issues are also at the root of the proposals already 
submitted from various quarters as part of the process of planning for 
the new pan-European edifice. 
a. The new Helsinki 11 Conference should give rise 1o new institutional 
arrangements and agreements for procedures and bodies 1o maintain 
peace and cooperation. There is a need 1o define the operating 
framewor1< for control mechanisms and the settlement of international 
disputes, within which territorial integrity and national sovereignty may 
be preserved. 
9. This is the only approach that wil enable the new peaceful pan-
European order to unfold, guaranteeing the people of Europe 
democracy, peace, mutual trust and poHtical, economic and cultural 
cooperation. 
11. FROM THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT TO THE CSCE: THE POINTS 
OF DEPARTURE 
10. With the exception of the UN Economic Commission for Europe, 
pre-1975 organizations and agreements reflected the Cold War 
climate and the atmosphere of mutual fear and cistrust which 
prevailed in Europe at that time. 
11. The signing of the Final Act was the ultimate expression of the 
people's desire for peace and cooperation and laid the foundation for 
the changes in Central and Eastern Europe, giving the future 
development of European nations a new geopolitical, strategic, 
political and economic cimension. 
12. The Final Act was signed on 1 August 1975 and covers three 
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basic areas of agreement: 
(a) a declaration of principles, 
(b) cooperation on economic affairs, science, technology and the 
environment, 
(c) cooperation on human affairs (human rights, culture, information 
and education). 
The Final Act devotes special attention to security and cooperation in 
the Mediterranean. 
The declaration of principles, known as the Helsinki 'Ten 
Commandments', anticipated present developments, making the 
following stipulations: 
1. Respect for the sovereign equality of states, 
2. Refraining from the threat or use of force, 
3. The inviolability of frontiers, 
4. Respect for territorial integrity, 
5. Peaceful settlement of disputes, 
6. Non-intervention in internal affairs, 
7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
8. The right 1o self-determination of peoples, 
9. Cooperation among slates in all fields, 
10. Fulfilment of all obligations under International law. 
Although the Final Act is a political text and not an international 
treaty, it has made a vital contribution to detente, the consolidabon of 
peace in Europe, respect for human rights and mutual understanding. 
13. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ended 
by adopting the final text of January 1989 in Vienna. This is the last 
important text after the Final Act in that it introduces new and stricter 
obligations on slates regarding the protection of human rights and 
brings disarmament within the scope of the CSCE process. 
14. As regards the application of the Helsinki principles, on balance 
the general trend has been favourable. Most of the principles of the 
'Ten Commandments' have been respected despite the fact that 
tension has increased and regional conflicts have intensified at 
international level. Also, the fact that Europe is still divided has not 
allowed the two opposing sides 1o move towards cooperation in the 
political, military and economic fields. 
15. The result of increasing superpower confrontation was the 
perpetuation of existing but also the creation of new regional focuses 
for military conflict and violations of territorial integrity and the frontiers 
of independent states, particularly 1n the Mediterranean reg1on. 
16. The violation of basic Helsinki principles was clear evidence of 
the need for intervention mechanisms 1o settle disputes and avert 
conflict. 
17. Present developmenus in Europe fully bear out the Helsinki 
principles and the CSCE accords and call for an international treaty 
to regulate aO aspects of the problems created by the new situation. 
Ill. THE NEW SITUATION IN EUROPE 
18. The changes in Europe symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall 
surpassed any prediction as 1o the speed at which they would happen 
and what form they would lake, pulling an end once and for all to 
post-war civisions. The basic principles of the Final Act were held 
high (the inviolability of frontiers, self-determination of peoples, 
peaceful settlement of disputes, human rights, etc.), underscoring the 
constant relevance and importance of Helsinki in promoting a climate 
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of reciprocity and trust 
19. The old order imposed by the Yalta accords is no more. The 
continuing changes in Central and Eastern Europe, reforms within the 
Soviet Union, the redundancy of the Warsaw Pact and the 
reunification of Germany have completely changed the face of 
security and the balance of power in Europe. 
20. The changes in Central and Eastern Europe are propelling their 
people towards multi-party democracy and full respect for human 
rights. 
21. However, they appear to be paying a high price for these 
reforms. The transition to a free economy has brought to the surface 
the enormous economic problems in these countries and has already 
created tremendous difficulties in adapting the economic and social 
systems to the new conditions. 
22. The Soviet Union which, as a superpower, was involved in a 
direct and equal struggle w1th the USA for wortd supremacy, is now 
caught up 1n the dynamics of perestroika. Faced on the home front 
with enormous political, social and economic problems and feeling the 
threat of nationalist upheavals in some of the republics, it is no longer 
in a position to play its dominant international role. 
23. The German reunification process, which swept aside the initial 
difficulties of substance which arose internally (and with neighbouring 
European countries), raises a great many problems - political, 
economic, defence - with a direct bearing on the future of Europe, 
though principally in terms of the new international balance of power 
and security which will inevitably come into being. 
24. For the first time since Yalta, these changes have given rise to 
a dimate of instability aeating a new quest for security in Europe. 
The questions which have already been raised as to whether the two 
military alliances (NATO and the WaruN Pact) should continue to 
operate with their present structure and objectives, the redefinition of 
the principles of security at national and at European level and the 
need for cooperation between states (or groups of states) are signs 
of efforts to find a framew()ri( for a pan-European security system and 
a new order for maintaining peace. 
IV. THE HELSINKI 11 CONFERENCE 
25. In the wake of the changes in Central and Eastern Europe the 
question of the future of existing European structures has resurfaced. 
26. There are a great many interesting proposals for setting up new 
instiMional structures for cooperation (and for adapting the old 
structures). One of the first ideas was put forward by Vaclav Havel 
for the creation of a Czed'loslovak-Polish federation as a 
counterweight to a unified Germany in Central Europe. In Bratislava, 
last April, the leaders of Hungary, Czed'loslovakia and Poland and 
representabVes of the governments of Austria, Yugoslavia and Italy 
met as an informal institutional body to discuss the possibility of 
resolving regional problems (borders, minorities, etc.) and 
coordinating their dealings with the European Community. 
In Poland there has been an increasingly lively debate around setting 
up a Baltic forum, to indude the Central European states (with the 
possibility of the Adriatic states taking part). The Balkan countries 
have already taken initiatives to cooperate in all sectors. 
27. All these initiatives are indicative of the efforts being made by 
European leaders to devise a framew()ri( for cooperation in the new 
Europe. lt seems, however, that they are all agreed (the USA and 
Canada included) that the most suitable framewort< for planning 
ahead - at the present stage at least - is the CSCE and the Helsinki 
11 Conference scheduled for the end of the year. 
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28. Many proposals, such as the Gorbachev proposal on the 
'common European home' have focused on the framework within 
which the Conference should operate. In his speech to the Council 
of Europe, the Soviet leader stressed the need for cooperation on 
security, the possibility of the USSR becoming a member of the 
Council of Europe with special status, the creation of a single 
economiC area stretching from the Adanlic to the Urals, the setting up 
of a regional and environment security system (within the framework 
of a long-term continent-wide environment programme) and the 
operation of a pan-European environment agency, etc. 
President Mitterrand proposed the setting up of a pan-European 
confederation. This proposal was supplemented by Jacques Delors' 
idea that the Community should be a federation w1thin the pan-
European confederation. 
Mr Delors bases his proposal on the theory of concentric circles, the 
European Community in its present form representing the inner c1rcle. 
The second circle would consist of the EFT A states which would 
consbtute the European economic area and the third circle would 
consist of the Central and East European states and, possibly, the 
Balkan and Mediterranean states. 
The Polish President Mazowiecki proposed that a European 
Cooperation Council should be set up, to indude the USA, Canada 
and the USSR. 
President Havel also proposed that a European Security Commission 
be set up in Prague composed of representatiVes of the CSCE states. 
A similar proposal was made by the Belgian Government to set up a 
European Defence Council. 
29. These proposals, in conjunction with the decisions taken by the 
European Council (in particular the special summit in Dublin) and the 
CSCE decisions and agreements (particularly the conferences held 
in Bonn on economic cooperation, Copenhagen on the human 
dimensiOn and Majorca on the Mediterranean dimension) and the 
conventional arms limitation agreements constitute a framewort< within 
which the Conference should operate. 
30. The fundamental objective of the Conference is to give final 
shape to a pan-European security system. To achieve this objective, 
progress must be made on the banning of chemical weapons, 
controlling the production and sale of arms, the organization of the 
armed forces and the future of foreign troops. At the same time, 
efforts must be stepped up to reduce conventional and nuclear 
weapons and set up a system of collective verification. 
31. As regards the redlction in the number of conventional 
weapons, two new rounds of negotiations are already in motion as a 
result of CSCE decisions. 
The first is concerned with reducing conventional forces in Europe 
and aims to achieve a balanced redlction over a wide area from the 
Atlantic to the Urals. The proposal put forward by NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact in the CSCE negotiations provides for a reduction of 
4700 fighter aircraft, 20 000 tanks, 60 500 pieces of artiHery for NATO 
and 24 000 for the WaruN Pact. In Ottawa last February it was also 
agreed that the number of US and Soviet troops in Central Europe 
would be reduced to 195 000 on each side and that 30 000 American 
troops would be stationed throughout the rest of the ATTU zone 
(Atlantic to the Urals). 
During the same negotiations the Soviets proposed that each Alliance 
should retain 700 000 troops in Central Europe whereas the Western 
allies insisted on further cuts. (The second round of negotiations is 
on confidence-building and security measures). 
32. As regards the two military alliances, there are two main areas 
for consideration: 
(a) given current developments, that they should be abolished in 
PE 141.404/fm. 
favour of a pan-European security system, 
(b) to achieve a smooth transition to a pan-European security 
system, the two altiancea must undergo a thorough 
reorganization and redefinition of their role, restricting the 
military aspects and transforming, under certain conditions, into 
political organizations, the ultimate aim being to incorporate 
both within the new pan-European security system. 
Questions have also been raised about the role of the Western 
European Union. Last April, the representatives of the member states 
of the Union decided to strengthen the role of the organization in 
monitoring disarmament agreements and promoting relations with 
Central and Eastern Europe. In the Gulf crisis, it was the Union that 
decided that West European forces would take part in the naval 
blockade of Iraq. 
33. The reunification of Germany - bringing together a member 
state of NATO, the Western European Union, the EEC and the 
Council of Europe on the one hand and a member state of the 
Warsaw Pact and COMECON on the other - is causing a veritable 
dilemma about its role in a pan-European security system. lt is 
imperative that any decisions taken either in the context of the 4 + 2 
talks or the CSCE should provide for the participation of a united 
Germany in the pan-European security system. 
34. A pan-European security system presupposes the peaceful co-
existence of the participating states and the peaceful settlement of 
disputes (whether these are transnational disputes, or separatist 
movementa challenging the status quo and the sovereignty of 
recognized states). 
However, it is an essential condition that a state of peace exista in 
the regions at the external borders of the system. lt is not possible 
to operate a collective security system in Europe when the 
Mediterranean- which is an important and integral part of Europe-
is the scene of intensifying confrontation and conflict, the violation of 
the sovereign righta of recognized states and of human righta. 
The recent crisis in the Gulf, but also the perennial problems in the 
Midcle East and the Mediterranean, particularly Cyprus, Palestine and 
Lebanon, are a threat to peace in the region and the security of 
Europe. 
35. Given that there is unanimous agreement that security and 
peace in Europe must be based on international cooperation and 
solidarity, the Helsinki 11 Conference must address the following basic 
issues: 
(a) the recognition and inviolability of current borders, respect for 
the sovereign equality of states and territorial integrity, 
(b) the definition of the right of self-determination and of the 
procedure for praclising it, 
(c) definition of the rights and obligations of minorities within states 
recognized by international treaties, within the framework of the 
principles of the Helsinki Final Act on respect for the unity and 
territorial integrity of states, 
(d) the institution of pluralist democracy and respect for human 
righta as a prerequisite for a country's participation in the new 
pan-European edifice, 
(e) a new dimension for human rights to meet the social and 
economic needs of individuals - the right to work, the right to 
welfare, the right to education etc., 
(f) the environment as a pan-European asset and its protection a pan-
European obligation. This calls for the mandatory implementation 
of the requisite measures by all the CSCE countries, 
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(g) drugs, organized crime and terrorism threaten social peace and 
create further international disputes. Regulations that are 
accepted and implemented joindy must therefore be introduced. 
36. A fundamental condition of maintaining peace in Europe is the 
balanced development of all states. A reduction in the economic gap 
between rich and poor countries and equal opportunities for economic 
development would create the right conditions for peaceful 
coexistence. To this end, consideration should be given within 
Helsinki 11 to the possibility of setting up a Solidarity Fund to aid the 
poorer countries of the Third World financed from resources saved 
through the abolition of conventional and nuclear weapons. 
V. INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES OF HELSINKI 11 
37. To implement and monitor the decisions of the Conference an 
institutional framework must be set up, comprising (a)a 
permanent secretariat 
(b) a committee of permanent representatives 
(c) a permanent seat 
(d) a Council of Foreign Ministers and 
(e) regular summit meetings. 
On the basis of the proposals concerning the institutional organization 
of the pan-European security system, these bodies should operate 
within the framework of a European Security Council. Furthermore, 
using the experience of the United Nations, all the intervention 
procedures and mechanisms should be set up for the peaceful 
setdement of disputes and the prevention of armed conflict through 
swift and effective action. 
38. If an these bodes are to be set up and operate correcdy, the 
voice of the people must be heard. The convocation of a 
parliamentary assembly, using the Council of Europe as a basis, 
would ensure democratic control over the whole European edifice and 
interpar1iamentary cooperation (with the national parliaments and the 
European Parliament) in the relevant sectors. Decisions taken by the 
Helsinki 11 institutional bodies should be the outcome of collective 
procedures, be subject to control by the parliamentary assembly and 
aim to preserve peace and avert conftict. 
39. An enhanced role for the European Court of Human Rights 
could be of parallel but no less importance in enforcing the legal 
obligations of states participating in the Conference to respect human 
rights. 
VI. THE COMMUNITY'S ROLE 
40. The European Community must take part in the Helsinki 11 
Conference as a single entity, acting independendy on a coordinated 
basis to meet the chaUenge of planning for the new Europe. 
Speeding up the process of economic and monetary union and 
political integration, and establishing a common foreign policy will also 
facilitate the attaiM18nt of this objective. 
41. The European Community is at present the only stable and 
dynamic supranatiorlal organization of states of a political and 
economic nature. lt is the only institutional body to which its Member 
States have granted powers to pursue to common policies. The level 
of integration, ita legislation, its common policies, economic 
interdependence and political stability are a unique historical example 
of international cooperation. 
42. The declaration by the Twelve in Dublin together with previous 
statements made at the summits in Madrid and Strasbourg indicate 
an emerging belief that the Community should play an instrumental 
role in preparing and making a success of the Helsinki 11 Conference. 
One of the aims of the Intergovernmental Conference on Political 
Union should be to define the Community's positions. 
PE 141.404/fin. 
43. The European Parliament is the body to ensure that democratic 
principles are applied in drawing up a joint foretgn policy and security 
policy. The European Parliament should play a full part in a well-
defined capacity at the conference. it is therefore proposed that 1t 
should be represenlied at the conference by its President and a small 
delegation of members and that it should be able to take part - with 
observer status- in all the CSCE conferences (as was the case at the 
Copenhagen Conference). it should also receive regular reports from 
the President of the Council as to the positions adoplied by the 
Twelve at the various CSCE conferences. 
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44. A Joint meeting between the European Parliament and the 
national parliaments of CSCE states could be the first step towards 
1nterpartiamentary cooperation and the setting up of the CSCE 
lnterparliamentary Assembly. 
45. In summary, we consider that the Community's presence at the 
Helsinki 11 Conference is absolutely essential for planning the new 
Europe which all Europeans aspire to. A new democratic Europe in 
which security is not based on the balance of military might but on 
mutual trust and cooperation. 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doe. 83-0759189) 
by MrGORIA 
pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure 
• 
on the conference on security and cooperation in Europe 
The European Parliament, 
ANNEX 
A. having carefully considered President Gorbachev's proposal to hold a pan-European conference in 1990 with a view to bringing forward the 
holdng of fresh dscussions on the rules governing security and cooperation in Europe, 
B. whereas the European Community in ita own right should also play a prominent role in the dscussions on security and, in particular, cooperation 
in Europe, 
1. Calls on the Council to: 
(a) take all the initiatives necessary to ensure that the Council, Commission and the European Parliament play an active role in the 
discussions on the holding of a pan-European conference in the near future; 
(b) take an the initiatives necessary to ensure that, if the pan-European conference is held, the Commission participates aa a ful member; 
2. Instructs iiS President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the parliaments and governments of the signatory stai8S 
to the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference. 
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